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RECONCILING MONETARY POLICY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Most of the critics of the monetarist approach to fighting infla-
tion are on the left, advocating various extensions of government power 
over private wage and price decisions. My own inclination being to tilt 
to the right, this critique is aimed from that end of the policy spec-
trum. Hopefully, it will be taken as a constructive proposal. 
Lest I be misunderstood, I am well aware of the power of monetary 
policy to influence the level of nominal, that is monetary, income or 
output and I am a strong advocate of its use. As a sometime participant 
in the policy making process, however, I am also well aware of the very 
powerful constraints that operate to inhibit monetary policy decision 
makers. The key constraint, both conceptual and political, I will call 
the Z factor -- which I define as the portion of the change in nominal 
output that is price; one minus Z, of course, is the portion of the 
change in nominal output that is "real." (Why Z? Because it is the 
last letter of the alphabet and perhaps a last recourse.) 
My concern is based on the painful knowledge that, in the early 
stages of a program of monetary restraint, the Z factor tends to be 
high. That is, the major initial impact of a slower growth in the 
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money supply tends to be lower real output rather than reduced infla-
tion. That relationship should not surprise us. We have learned in 
specific areas of the economy that short run responses to price and 
income changes are smaller than long run adjustments. For example, it 
is now generally agreed that the price elasticity of the demand for 
energy is much lower in the short run than in the long run. 
To be sure, continuation of a policy of monetary restraint 
such as a stable growth of the money supply over a sustained period of 
time will result in a change in expectations and in business and 
consumer decision making and thus in a subsequent decline in the Z fac-
tor. 
However, it is in the short run that political forces enter, and 
for fairly sensible reasons. When the short term effects of monetary 
restraint lead to a rise in unemployment, a shift in national priori-
ties usually follows, from curbing inflation to reducing joblessness. 
In general, those political pressures effectively prevent the monetary 
authorities from continuing the posture of restraint which, if it had 
been maintained long enough, could have altered expectations, reduced 
the Z factor, and yielded the results generally desired by society. 
Indeed, expectations generally are based on the workings of this cycle 
in political economy. 
Incomes policies, of course, attempt to provide an answer to this 
dilemma. We need to recognize the basic reason that incomes policies --
both voluntary and compulsory, both here and abroad -- have been resorted 
to. It is hardly because we as a nation like to interfere with private 
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decision making or that the citizenry is enamored with the success of 
government intervention. Rather it is that citizens and policy makers 
have not been satisfied with the apparent results of indirect measures 
such as monetary and fiscal policy and will support at times a more 
activist policy stance. But a more satisfying approach than incomes 
policy experiments, however, may be to change the size of Z, especially 
in the short run. 
As has been amply demonstrated in the recent literature, there is 
a myriad of government legislation, rules, and expenditures which inter-
fere with competition, raise prices, or restrict the supply of factors 
and products. These range from government determination of 11 prevailing 11 
wages to restrictions on the use of transportation facilities to sup-
ports of product prices to limitations on imports. But the concern I 
raise here is not the conventional one of economic freedom and effi-
ciency (which I personally share), but the large welfare costs of these 
government activities, viewed in terms of the unemployment that results 
from their interference with the workings of macroeconomic policy. 
The changes that I have in mind are in terms of moving toward a 
more competitive market economy in which labor and product markets would 
be more price-elastic than is presently the case. There are several 
routes that can be followed simultaneously in pursuing this objective 
conventional antitrust policy, regulatory reform, and a reduction in the 
whole range of government subsidies. 
In the antitrust area, one specific approach comes to mind -- re-
ducing the various statutory 11 immunities 11 from antitrust prosecution. 
We could do well to lift the exemptions from the competitive norm now 
101 
extended to many product markets, such as interstate trucking, milk 
marketing, maritime activities, etc. Moreover, it may be time to think 
about the unthinkable -- reducing the broad immunity extended to most 
labor union activities, which covers so many aspects of product as well 
as labor markets. 
In the area of government regulation, we only need to refer to 
the expanding literature on the excessive costs of many regulatory acti-
vities and the ways to reduce their negative impacts. It is important, 
moreover, to view these governmentally-imposed impediments in a dynamic 
sense. In a static world, the one-shot elimination of costly government 
regulation would have only a one-period effect on the inflation rate. 
But in the real world of government policy making, we are faced with the 
phenomenon of a rapidly expanding network of regulatory requirements. 
Viewed in that light, a regulatory reform effort which is steadily 
bringing down the costs that would otherwise be imposed on the private 
sector would yield rising returns over an extended period of time. 
The current concern with reducing or at least slowing down the 
size of government could well focus on the various subsidies embedded 
in procurement, credit, and expenditure programs -- subsidies which 
shelter numerous groups from market forces and make more difficult and 
expensive the access to those products and markets by the rest of the 
population. The supply of factors and products has been restricted by 
such government subsidies as production and import quotas and generous 
government stockpiles of minerals and metals. The opportunities for 
reducing the Z factor are as exciting as they are numerous. 
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Of course, these microeconomic structural and institutional 
changes must be seen as supplements to appropriate monetary and fiscal 
policy. Indeed, these changes would enhance the effectiveness of these 
traditional macroeconomic tools. 
Overcoming the natural reluctance to cite one's own earlier work, 
I recall the conclusions of an article in a 1972 issue of the ~eview of 
Economics and Statistics in which I wrote that, over the coming decade, 
this nation may be increasingly resorting to greater controls over wage 
and price decisions in imperfect factor and product markets, unless we 
take strong actions to reduce those market imperfections. " ..• the 
choice may well be between fostering a greater degree of competition in 
private markets or relying more heavily on government controls over pri-
vate decision making." Wistfully and reluctantly, I repeat my earlier 
conclusion as a forecast for the next decade. 
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